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Abstract

Over the past few years, one of Indonesia’s state-owned enterprises, PLN, has conducted dialogues focusing
on developing a new value-creative business model to transform itself, a sleepy regulated utility, into a truly
competitive electricity service provider. However, efforts to preserve the prominence of the Country’s electricity
sector have been ongoing as the sector is still experiencing sustained rolling blackouts, net import dependency
and lack of transmission facility enforcement throughout the Indonesian archipelago. Such efforts have been
varied from the incentivise policy and programs such as the Public-Private Partnership and the two phases
of Fast Track Program. The reformation of electricity law dated back on the 1985, 2002 and 2009 to attract
investors in the development of Indonesia’s electricity sector have been enacted, but a controversial issue arose
from the annulment of the Law No. 20 Year 2002 on Electricity by the Constitutional Court Decision No. 001021-022/PUU-I/2003 stating that such law which clearly stating that the requirement to privatise electricity
operation was unconstitutional. This article will try to provide a comprehensive comparative analysis of such
decision with the common practice adopted by the EU which has successfully implemented its deregulation
and separation of the electricity’s business chain through unbundling the sector as part of liberalisation.
Keywords: unbundling, third-party access, independent system operator (ISO), independent transmission
operator (ITO), fast track program, public-private partnership, electricity, Indonesia.
Abstrak
Dalam kurun beberapa tahun terakhir, salah satu badan usaha milik negara, PLN, telah melakukan
beberapa dialog untuk membahas perkembangan sebuah model bisnis baru yang memiliki nilai kreatif untuk
mentransformasi perusahaan, pengaturan utilitas yang tak tersentuh menjadi penyedia jasa listrik yang lebih
kompetitif. Akan tetapi, berbgai cara telah dilakukan untuk mempertahankan sektor kelistrikan Indonesia,
namun sektor ini masih mengalami pemadaman bergilir, ketergantungan akan impor dan kurangnya fasilitas
transmisi di seluruh penjuru Indonesia. Cara-cara yang telah dilakukan tersebut bermacam-macam, mulai
dari kebijakan dan program yang menginsentivasi para investor, contohnya melalui Kemitraan PemerintahSwasta dan ketiga fase Fast Track Program. Reformasi akan undang-undang ketenagalistrikan telah dimulai
dari tahun 1985, 2002 dan 2009 yang dimaksudkan untuk menarik para investor untuk berpartisipasi
dalam sektor kelistrikan di Indonesia. Namun, isu kontroversial timbul setelah Mahkamah Konstitusi RI
dalam putusannya No. 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003 membatalkan keberlakuan Undang-Undang No. 20
Tahun 2002 tentang Ketenagalistrikan yang menyatakan bahwa ketentuan mengenai privatisasi kegiatan
ketenagalistrikan dalam undang-undang tersebut tidak konstitusional. Tulisan ini akan mencoba untuk
menyediakan analisis perbandingan menyeluruh terhadap putusan tersebut dengan mengacu pada praktik
di EU sebagai salah satu contoh negara yang telah berhasil menerapkan konsep deregulasi dan pemisahan
rantai bisnis ketenagalistrikan melalui proses penguraian dan liberalisasi.
Keywords: unbundling, akses pihak ketiga, operator sistem independen (ISO), operator transmisi independen
(ITO), , kemitraan publik dan privat, ketenagalistrikan, Indonesia.
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I. INTRODUCTION

INDONESIA’S ENERGY SECURITY

Indonesia’s general trend in economic growth is in a strong position, having
achieved an average growth of 5.^94 percent year-on-year in the December quarter
of 2015.1 Such robust growth has been undeniably spurred by a population of 255
million2 (including an emerging middle class of 74 million3) which is undergoing an
unprecedented degree of urbanization and industrialization. This growth should lead
to Indonesia’s increasing demand for electricity at around 8.^9% per annum (p.a.) in
the foreseeable future, after a relatively slower rate of 6% for 2014 due to higher
electricity prices and slower economic growth4, which means that it is expected to
translate into growth in electricity demand from an estimated 153 terawatt hours
(TWh) in 2011 to 223 TWh by 2016.5
In view of the above mentioned relationship between energy and Indonesia’s
economic growth, it is safe to say that energy, especially electricity, has a crucial
economic value with a strong symbiosis relationship. One cannot work properly
without the existence of the other. In fact, in some countries like the EU electricity has
also been considered as a commodity in the case law of the European Court of Justice,
and as such, its price should be determined by supply and demand.6 However, aside
from this, energy also contains an essential public service obligation (‘PSO’) which
leads to a state monopoly right in return.7 The primary reason to do so is because
energy is seen to be a public good, pertained to everyone and without differentiation
on material status.8 In other words, the state’s vertically integrated undertaking
(‘VIU’) has the obligation to provide access to electricity at the most affordable costs
for Indonesian ‘people’ (as mandated under Article 33 of the Constitution) by pressing
its operational costs as low as possible.

Given the fact that the Indonesian Government has tried to restructure its electricity
industry to meet such demand, it had enacted Law No. 20 Year 2002 on Electricity
to promote the unbundling9 scheme to open up the Indonesian electricity market.10
Such approach was intended to open up the market to the private sector as a capital

1
Trading Economics, “Indonesia GDP Annual Growth Rate,” http://www.tradingeconomics.com/indonesia/gdp-growth-annual, accessed on March 6, 2016.
2
Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook 2015,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html, accessed on March 6, 2016.
3
Vaishali Rastogi, Eddy Tamboto, Dean Tong and Tunee Sinburimsit, “Indonesia’s Rising Middle-Class
Consumers: Asia’s Next Big Opportunity,” https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/center_
consumer_customer_insight_consumer_products_indonesias_rising_middle_class_affluent_consumers/,
accessed on March 6, 2016.
4
Perusahaan Listrik Negara, “Annual Report 2014: Towards New Performance Level,” http://www.
pln.co.id/dataweb/AR/ARPLN2014.pdf, accessed on March 6, 2016.
5
PriceWaterhouse Coopers, “Power in Indonesia: Investment and Taxation Guide, April 2013 – 2nd
Edition,”
https://www.pwc.com/id/en/energy-utilities-mining/assets/Power%20Guide%202015%20
(final-octL).pdf, accessed on March 6, 2016.
6
Ibid.,
7
Peter D Cameron, Competition in Energy Markets: Law and Regulation in the European Union (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.13.
8
Bartlomiej Nowak, “Equal Access to the Energy Infrastructure as a Precondition to Promote Competition in the Energy Market: The Case of European Union.” Energy Policy Vol. 38 (2010): 3691.
9
Unbundling means running energy transmission and distribution networks independently from
the production and supply side. See Zornica Zafirova, “Unbundling the Network: The Case for Ownership
Unbundling?” International Energy Law and Taxation Review Vol. 2 (2007): 29.
10
Indonesia, Undang-Undang tentang Ketenagalistrikan (Law regarding Electricity), UU No. 20 Tahun
2002, LN No. 94 Tahun 2002 (Law Number 20 Year 2002, SG No. 94 Year 2002), art. 16.
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incentive to cut operational costs. However, the aforementioned law was revoked by
Constitutional Court Decision No. 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003 which clearly states
that the requirement to privatize electricity operation is unconstitutional.11 As one of
the consequences, a fundamental question has been raised concerning the following
said correlation: should electricity, like all material goods, especially finite goods, be
left to market forces, or should it be available to everyone when there are those who
cannot afford to pay a fair market price for it (thus the electricity price should be
regulated)?12 This article will try to evaluate such decision and analyze all possible
options in order to provide solutions to this challenge.
II. PAST HISTORY AND THE LATEST DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDUSTRY
A. From the ‘Keynesian’ Paradigm in Energy Law to Its Turning Point
The energy sector, and the electricity sector in particular, is the key feature of sustainable national
economies around the globe. Consequently, governments have become involved in the development of
energy resources and in setting up the framework within which energy markets operate.13 Electricity
was developed during the last decades of the nineteenth century, characterized with the establishment of
electricity and gas supply companies by municipalities in order to supply local communities into an

extended development of interconnected national grids.14

A traditional paradigm in managing electricity sector is known as the ‘Keynesian
Paradigm’. It is a paradigm established during the period from 1945 to 1980 in which
the energy sector was either owned or dominated by governments.15 In that period
(period of post-World War II), state intervention in the electricity sector is evident in
the form of the following:16
The operations of industries were usually exempted from the scope of national
competition law, and entry of new players into the market was excluded or strictly
limited by statute;

PSO were imposed on the industry with respect to quality of treatment and
continuity of service with exclusive rights that amounted to a monopoly in return; and
Supplying increasing quantities of energy at affordable prices.

The economic rationale for such a structure was that electricity production was a
natural monopoly.17 In practice, electricity sectors almost everywhere in earth evolved
with (primarily) vertically integrated geographic monopolies that were state-owned

Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, “Decision No. 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003,” p.343.
Nowak, Loc.cit.
13
Ińigo del Guayo, Catherine Redgwell, Martha M Roggenkamp, and Anita Rønne, “Energy Law in
Europe: Comparisons and Conclusions” in Energy Law in Europe: National, EU and International Regulation.
2nd ed. Edited by Martha M Roggenkamp, Chatherine Redgwell, Ińigo del Guayo and Anita Rønne (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2007), p.1267.
14
Donald N. Zillman, Martha M. Roggenkamp, Lila Barrera-Hernández and Ińigo del Guayo, “Energy
Networks and the Law: Innovative Solutions in Changing Markets” in Energy Law and the Law: Innovative
Solutions in Changing Markets. Edited by Martha M. Roggenkamp, Lila Barrera-Hernández, Donald N. Zillman and Ińigo del Guayo (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), p.10.
15
Nowak, loc.cit.
16
Cameron, loc.cit.
17
James M. Griffin and Steven L. Puller, “Introduction: A Primer on Electricity and the Economics of
Deregulation” in Electricity Deregulation: Choices and Challenges. Edited by James M. Griffin and Steven L.
Puller (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005), p.2.
11
12
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or privately-owned and subject to price and entry regulation as natural monopolies.18
A natural monopoly is simply the case where a single firm can produce the total market
output at a lower cost than a collection of individual competitive firms is able to do.19
Such condition leads to the integration of the primary components of electricity
supply – generation, transmission, distribution and retail supply – within individual
electric utilities. As a result, these firms in turn had de facto exclusive franchises to
supply electricity to residential, commercial as well as industrial retail consumers
within a defined geographic area.20

As promising as it were, the economic burden needs to be rested in the sole players
of the market (hereinafter referred as ‘VIU’s), such as: (i) high operating costs, (ii)
construction cost overruns on new facilities, (iii) high retail prices, and (iv) falling
costs of production from new facilities development, which stimulated pressures for
changes that would reduce electricity costs and retail prices in order to achieve a
sustainable electricity supply.21 As a further impact resulting from failure to achieve
such goal could result in blackouts. Blackouts can impose large externalities on the
economy; at the same time, the provision of reserves capacity also has important
public good characteristics.22 Therefore, restructured power systems will require
the market to provide adequate reserve capacity and ensure that extra generating
capacity is always available so that the lights stay on and the industry keeps running.23
There were basically three types of determinants that led to reviewing the
relationship between the State and natural monopolies, which can be described as
follows:24

1) Economic. These sectors did not have good performance results under state
ownership and management and a single, vertically integrated state-owned
monopoly was considered as being less efficient than a market structure
with more players;
2) Technological. Monopoly does not favor innovation; and

3) Political and refers to the shift in the conception of the role of the state in
the market.

A new economic and legal paradigm that emerged in 1980s was characterized
by market liberalization, privatization and competition.25 Such a shift of paradigm
in restructuring the electricity market is designed to enhance economic efficiency
at all levels of operation, including distribution, transmission, generation and retail
services.26 The gains are likely to be largest in electric generation because generation
costs are the largest components of end-use costs and restructuring has a larger
impact on generation than on other segments of the electricity industry, such as
18
Paul L. Joskow, “Lessons Learned from Electricity Market Liberalization.” The Energy Journal, Special Issue. The Future of Electricity: Papers in Honor of David Newbery (2008), p.10.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid., p.11.
22
Griffin, loc.cit., p.6.
23
Ibid.
24
Cristina Havriş, “Competition and Regulation in the EU Energy Market,” Romanian Journal of European Affairs Vol. 9 No. 4 (2009): p.18.
25
Ibid., p.353.
26
Catherine Wolfram, “The Efficiency of Electricity Generation in the United States after Restructuring” in Electricity Deregulation: Choices and Challenges. Edited by James M. Griffin and Steven L. Puller
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005), p.227.
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transmission and distribution, which are likely to remain more heavily regulated.27

Throughout the 1990s, governments in countries around the world began to
change the ground rules which are characterized as a movement from ‘traditional
regulation for competition.’28 This idea developed from a simple thinking: ‘the
institutional configuration of system based on the technically-centralized model can
be restructured, and monopoly rights can be withdrawn to permit different suppliers
to compete for customers.’29 As a result, a new paradigm in government – energy
industry relations has emerged, based on greater reliance on markets in which it
has sought to introduce competition whenever possible, encouraging openness,
decentralized production with network access, and remuneration on the basis of
market prices, rather than costs.30
Today’s market for power stands in stark contrast to the structure of the industry
just over a decade ago.31 In the present case, the electricity reform has taken place over
the last fifteen years in various countries and more than a dozen existing restructured
electricity markets around the world.32
B. The Pioneer of Energy Markets Liberalization: EU’s Case

1. The Historical Background of EU’s Policy and Institutional Reform in the
Energy Market
The rationale and goal of European electricity market reforms over the last couple
of decades are to open electricity markets and to giving consumers the choice of a
supplier through introducing competition where possible and complementing it with
regulation of the parts that would remain monopolistic.33 In particular, in order to
establish Regional Electricity Markets (‘REM’) as a step towards the establishment
of the internal electricity market, sufficient interconnection capacity, which heavily
characterized with natural monopolies, is necessary and that capacity should be
made available to market participation.34 Therefore, access to electricity networks
is essential. Thus far, the EU has confronted electricity restructuring at three
levels: treaty revision, statute-like measures, and pan-European and Member State
administrative implementation.35

The establishment of the EU internal market in Energy, particularly in the
electricity and gas sectors, has been a priority for more than 15 years.36 And eventually
in 2009, the EU’s approach to successfully create internal energy market is to open up
Ibid.
Cameron, op.cit., p.9.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid., p.10.
31
Griffin, loc.cit.
32
Ross Baldick and Hui Niu, “Lessons Learned: The Texas Experience” in Electricity Deregulation:
Choices and Challenges. Edited by James M. Griffin and Steven L. Puller (Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 2005), p.182.
33
Rozeta Karova, “Capacity Reservations at Interconnectors: An Analysis Under EU Competition and
EU Energy Law,” Competition and Regulatory Network Industry Vol. 13 (2012): p.237.
34
Ibid.
35
Charles H. Koch Jr., “Collaborative Governance: Lessons for Europe from U.S. Electricity Restructuring,” College of William & Mary Law School Faculty Publications Paper 1270, (2009): p.81.
36
Peter D Cameron, “The Internal Market in Energy: Harnessing the New Regulatory Regime,” Energy
Law Review (2005): p.631.
27
28
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a space for planning within liberalization and competition, two new legal principles
that are completely different from the Keynesian Paradigm.37 These principles were
introduced in order to fight monopolies and ensure security of supplies and were
not directed at guaranteeing investment in infrastructure through governmental
compulsory planning, but rather to open up markets, break monopolies, unbundle
integrated companies, and introduce third party access (‘TPA’) obligations.38
Considering the fact that competition in the market is pivotal and interdependent
between the Government and investors, the Government is under an obligation to
create an effective regulatory regime in order to enable investors to participate in
the industry. By doing so, it does not only serve the purpose of allowing investors to
gain profits under infrastructure investment, but also securing security of electricity
supply for customers in the long run. According to Freeman, the goals of efficacy and
legitimacy are better served by a model that views the administrative process as a
problem-solving exercise in which parties share responsibility for all stages of the
rule-making process, in which solutions are provisional, and in which the state plays
an active, if varied, role.39 Therefore, it is highly encouraged for Governments to use
this approach to ensure competitiveness in the market.
2. Current System and Policy

The first action in the informal pursuit of market liberalization was the creation
of the Energy Charter Treaty, which was signed and ratified in 1994 by fiftyone signatories located both within and outside the EU, aimed at creating a legal
framework dedicated to the promotion of long-term international cooperation in the
energy sector.40 This was for the purpose of open up the European market to thirdparty players.
Followed by the First and Second Energy Directives (Directive 1996/92/EC and
Directive 2003/54/EC) whereby the former administrative unbundling (or ‘Chinese
walls’), the weakest concept of unbundling, was introduced, while the latter is the legal
unbundling regime (stronger than the administrative unbundling, however weaker
than ownership unbundling). The first directive was ineffective as it only provided
the separation of account of the VIU for the network and supply and production
(along with managerial separation). Although the directive did require authorities
to be ‘independent of electricity generation, transmission and distribution activities’,
no elucidation was provided on the extent of independence necessary.41 Therefore, it
has been criticized for not going far enough to transform traditional energy market
structures.42

Under the Second Directive, legal unbundling was required whereby national
transmission systems were required to be legally separate from activities not relating
to transmission or distribution. Furthermore, Member States were obligated to set
Guayo, op.cit., p.354.
Ibid., p.353.
39
Ibid.
40
Claudia A Duncan, “Lessons from the United States and Texas: Market Liberalization of the Natural
Gas and Electricity Markets in Europe,” Texas Journal of Oil Gas and Energy Law Vol. 10 (2014): p.332.
41
Eva Barrett, “A Case of: Who Will Tell The Emperor He Has No Clothers? – Market Liberalization,
Regulatory Capture and The Need for Further Improved Electricity Market Unbundling Through a Fourth
Energy Package,” Journal of World Energy Law & Business Vol. 9 (2015): p.5.
42
L Hancher, in ibid.
37
38
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up independent national regulatory authorities to: (i) monitor national markets;
(ii) approve the conditions for connection of new electricity producers; and (iii)
handle complaints and supervise network access and tariffs. While the provision
on independence was strengthened to require regulators to be ‘wholly independent
from the interests of the electricity industry’, again no elucidation was provided on
the extent of independence necessary.43 As a consequence, it recognized that legal
and functional unbundling had not solved the fundamental conflict of interests
within integrated companies, whereby the supply and production interests aimed to
maximize their sales and market share while the network operator was obligated to
offer non-discriminatory access to competitors.44

EU’s Third Energy Packages looks to ensure that all European citizens are able to take
advantage of the numerous benefits provided by a truly competitive common energy
market.45 The main focus highlighted in this legislative package includes consumer
choice; fairer price; cleaner energy; security of supply; independent regulatory nondiscriminatory third-party access, and proper unbundling.46 Under this directive,
three models of unbundling were introduced: (i) Ownership Unbundling (OU); (ii)
Independent System Operator (ISO); and (iii) Independent Transmission Operator
(ITO). Ownership Unbundling is the strongest form of unbundling as it requires the
undertaking which owns the transmission system to act as the Transmission System
Operator with responsibility for: (i) granting and managing third party access to the
system; (ii) collecting access charges; (iii) congestion charges and payments under
the inter-TSO compensation mechanism; and (iv) maintaining and developing the
transmission system and investment planning.47 While in the ISO and ITO, the network
is owned by the undertaking and operated with independent system operator.
However, as a clear distinction between the ISO and ITO models, under the ITO model
the system operators are only legally separated within the same undertaking with
supply and production activities. This recalls the failure of the legal unbundling under
the Second Directive and contradicts the main objective of unbundling in the first
place.
III. THE SO-CALLED ‘EFFECTIVE ENERGY MARKET’: THE WHYS AND HOWS
A. Electricity as a Commodity: Nature and Characteristics
There are several unique characteristics in electricity which make this commodity
special. Unlike fossil fuels or other energy sources, electricity is not extracted from
nature, ready to use for energy purposes with some processing.48 As a secondary
energy source, electricity needs to be manufactured using one of the primary energy
sources, such as: (i) fossil fuel combustion, (ii) uranium-based nuclear reaction, (iii)
the power of falling water, (iv) sunshine, or wind, that allows turbines and generators
to operate producing the electricity that can provide heat or light, run an immense
Barrett, loc.cit.
Ibid.
45
Bartlomiej Nowak, “Energy Market of the European Union: Common or Segmented?” The Electricity
Journal Vol. 20 No. 10 (2010): p.29.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
48
Zillman, op.cit., p.5.
43
44
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variety of industrial and business machines and residential appliances.49 It also needs
to be borne in mind that electricity cannot be stored economically, so the amount
generated at any point in time must equal the amount consumed.50 It is a complex
system, consisting of much more than just the technical infrastructure for the
generation, transmission and distribution of electricity.51

By European definition, generation, transmission and distribution of electricity
can be described respectively as follows:52
1. ‘generation’ means the production of electricity;
2. ‘transmission’ means the transport of electricity on the extra high-voltage
and high-voltage interconnected system with a view to its delivery to
final customers or to distributors, but does not include supply;
3. ‘distribution’ means the transport of electricity on high-voltage, mediumvoltage and low-voltage distribution systems with a view to its delivery
to customers, but does not include supply.
While according to national law, electricity generation, transmission and
distribution are respectively defined as follows:53
1. ‘the generation of electrical power’ is the activity to produce electric
power;
2. ‘the transmission of electric power’ is the transport of electric power
from the generation of electric power to the distribution system or
consumers or the transportation of electric power from one system to
another;
3. ‘the distribution of electric power’ is the transport of electric power
from the transmission system or the generation of electric power to
consumers.
In its operational framework, electric energy is injected into the transmission
grid by all generators and withdrawn by all end users.54 Hence, such characteristics
of delivered power must be carefully maintained so that the quantity injected must
closely match with the quantity withdrawn moment by moment in order to maintain
the frequency within a certain narrow band of tolerance.55 One noteworthy point
which needs to be highlighted is that, traditionally, each sector of the industry –
generation at power plants, high-voltage transmission of power, and local distribution
and metering – has natural monopoly characteristics.56
B. Competitive Market to Secure Electricity Supply

It is widely recognized that free market competition favors efficiency and thus
contributes to lower prices.57 Creating a competitive market, where it was non-existent

Ibid.
Griffin., Op.cit., p.5.
51
Barbara Praetorius, et al. Innovation for Sustainable Electricity Systems: Exploring the Dynamics of
Energy Transitions, (Germany: Physica-Verlag Heidelberg, 2009), p.2.
52
European Parliament and European Council, Directive Concerning Common Rules for the Internal
Market in Electricity and Repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, 13 July 2009, Directive 2009/72/EC, art. 2 available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:211:0055:0093:EN:PDF. Accessed on March 7, 2016.
53
Indonesia, Undang-Undang tentang Ketenagalistrikan (Law regarding Electricity), UU No. 30 Tahun
2009, LN No. 94 Tahun 2002 (Law Number 20 Year 2002, SG No. 133 Year 2009), art. 1.
54
Griffin, loc.cit.
55
Ibid.
56
Griffin, loc.cit.
57
Barbora Hrabčáková and Tomáš Lipták, “EU Legislation on the Electricity Market: Introducing Com49
50
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before, requires a country to implement a wide range of structural and regulatory
reforms in which the following eight principles are believed to be potentially helpful
in achieving the intended goal, namely: (i) unbundle vertical monopolies; (ii) create
a wholesale electricity market’ (iii) guarantee access to the transmission grid; (iv)
establish an independent regulator; (v) entrench reforms in the legal system; (vi)
be careful with independent power projects (‘IPPs’); (vii) consider private sector
participation, corporation and privatization; and lastly, (viii) gain public support.58

In industrial policy, moving towards a regulatory state involves four key features:
(i) privatization of state-owned enterprises; (ii) liberalization – that is, ending state
monopolies; (iii) ‘re-regulation’ – that is, establishing rules governing competitive
supply; and (iv) establishing or strengthening independent/semi-independent
regulatory bodies.59 The last feature, however, is the most important yet overlooked
component in electricity market reform.
Energy liberalization/restructuring started with the “unbundling” of three
obviously related, yet separate, segments of electricity production and delivery,
namely: generation, transmission, and distribution.60

1. The Concept of Unbundling
Ensuring equal and non-discriminatory access to networks, which is key if
open and competitive markets are to evolve, some agree has been achieved throughout
unbundling.61 The main reason behind introducing unbundling is the fostering of
competition.62 It is aimed to eliminate incentives or abilities to discriminate against
competitors by means of their control of assets upstream or downstream from the
transmission network.63 In order to mitigate incentives for discriminating against
competitors, and to increase equality in access to the market, it is necessary both
to separate the transmission and distribution activities of a network business
form its activities of production and supply (unbundling) as well as to ensure
non-discriminatory access of third parties to the infrastructure such as networks,
storage capacities or LNG terminals.64 In other words, unbundling is imperative to
eliminate the influence of the VIUs in operating the transmission networks to enable
competition, third party access, and development of the facilities.
There are several benefits of unbundling which need to be taken into
consideration. The benefits of this concept are as follows:65 (i) improving competition;
(ii) improving quality of regulation; and (iii) improving performance of the network.
However, the success of this concept in securing energy supply heavily relies on
petition. Interaction between Sector-Specific Regulation and EU Competition Rules. Third Legislative Package,” Common Law Review Vol. 13 (2014): p.62.
58
Philip Andrews-Speed and Robert Pritchard, “Eight Principles of Electricity Industry Reform,” International Energy Law & Taxation Review Vol. 1 (2001): p.11.
59
Mark Thatcher, “From Industrial Policy to a Regulatory State: Contrasting Institutional Change in
Britain and France’ in Jack Hayward and Anad Menon (ed), Governing Europe (Oxford University Press),
p.316.
60
Charles H. Koch Jr., “Collaborative Governance in the Restructured Electricity Industry,” College of
William & Mary Law School Faculty Publications Paper 47 (2005): p.593 available at http://scholarship.law.
wm.edu/facpubs/47, accessed on March 7, 2016.
61
Nowak, op.cit., p.3693.
62
Zafirova, op.cit., p.30.
63
Cameron, Competition in Energy Markets, op.cit., p.32.
64
Nowak, op.cit., p.3692.
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the assumption that the Transmission System Operator (TSO) is able to deliver its
assigned responsibilities with a high level of integrity, accountability, transparency
and professionalism. After all, the TSO is under obligation to operate and develop
the transmission system to ensure that the electricity supply can be delivered on
real time basis to end consumers. Therefore, the Government needs to ensure the
effectiveness of national regulatory regime through ex-ante regulation and post ante
regulation through competition law.
2. Third Party Access (‘TPA’) to the Networks

Networks can be broadly defined to include everything that occurs between the
initial extraction or capture of an energy resource and its final use by a consumer.66 As
a regulatory tool, TPA constitutes the key to the liberalization of the electricity market
in Europe.67 The concept broadly refers to the possibility for electricity suppliers (e.g.
independent power producers, trading companies) and/or customers (e.g. domestic
or industrial purchases) to make use of electricity grids that do not own or control in
order to sell or buy electricity.68
Competition can be promoted in the generation/production and the supply side
of the vertical integration, transmission and distribution segments remain natural
monopolies that hinder market mechanism.69 For such reason, non-discriminatory
and equal access to the electricity and gas transmission and distribution networks
is crucial for competition to evolve.70 The absence of such elements would create an
enormous entry barrier for new players and would severely hamper the development
of a competitive market.71

However, as of today, electricity supply networks are facing enormous challenges
that need to be overcome in order to ensure supply in the future.72 Energy transmission
networks have monopolistic behavior due to limited infrastructures to transport
energy from generation to final costumers. Due to this factor, access to the network by
a third party is an important element for broadening energy market by allowing access
to the system to those intending to invest in the market.73 The obligation is vested in
the TSO to ensure non-discriminatory access to the network by third parties.74 Third
party access then has an impact on energy security by increasing supply of energy
corresponding to demands as well as increase competition which is consequently
bound to reduce the price of energy to the affordability of final consumers. Therefore,
it can be argued that TSO plays an important role when opening the system to third
parties which will ensure that the system capacity to carry or store energy is utilized
to the maximum extent of capacity and hence stimulate investment in the generating
Zillman, op.cit., p.9.
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3. Anti-Competition Law

As described above, the sector is currently undergoing the process of transformation
from a monopoly industry to a competitive market. Taking the EU electricity market
as an example, it is clear that as a result, the competitors on the electricity market
are exposed to two-fold regulation affecting competitive conditions: sector-specific
(ex-ante) regulation and (ex-post) competition regulation whereby the latter involves
interaction between regulatory bodies: the central policy maker (the Commission)
on the one hand, and National Regulatory Authorities and National Competition
Authorities on the other.76
The mindset that competition law alone is sufficient to make network-bound
electricity and gas markets effectively flourish is simply wrong.77 Rather than that,
regulating for competition by providing a set of explicit common rules (ex-ante) has
been a prerequisite for the achievement of energy market reform.78 Competition
and regulation are more complementary than substitutes.79 If the TSO abuses its
dominant position in the transmission system, there will be no incentive to energy
generators to increase capacity of generation or third parties to invest in the market.
Increase in third party access to the system would stimulate research, innovation
and investment in new transmission networks to sustain the capacity available and
manage congestion thus enabling sufficient supply of energy to the market. Therefore,
it can be argued that competition law is an effective tool to stop infringement caused
by VIUs which abuse their dominant position in the energy market.
IV.

Indonesia’s Latest Development in the Electricity Sector

With economic growth rates ranging between 6-7% predicted in the near future,
Indonesia is expected to face both opportunities as well as challenges.80 A number
of inputs are required to sustain such growth rates, including access to affordable,
reliable energy services.81 However, Indonesia’s electricity sector is facing numerous
challenges in its development, including (i) a mismatch between the availability of
primary energy resources, whereby the supply of energy is located mostly outside
Java and Bali; (ii) in 2012, the percentage of oil for producing electricity (in relation
to fuel mix) was still relatively high (15.^92%) despite the abundance of coal resources
within the country; and (iii) limited availability of government funds and other
resources to finance the construction of new power plants as well as transmission
and distribution networks.82 The latter challenge will become the main focus of this
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article which will be fully analyzed below.

INDONESIA’S ENERGY SECURITY

A. Indonesian Electricity Sector: De Jure
The modern era for the power sector in Indonesia commenced with the
1985 Electricity Law allowing limited private participation in power generation.83
Essentially, the model involved allowing for private investment in power generating
assets as Independent Power Producers (‘IPP’s) licensed to sell their power solely to
the state-owned electricity company, PLN, pursuant to Power Purchase Agreements
(‘PPA’s).84 As some research indicates, there was a significant growth of at least 65%
by 1999.85 Therefore, PLN as the sole purchaser of the power output became the key
driver of the commerciality of the entire value chain. The IPP program however was
effectively frozen in the late 1990s when the Asian financial crisis hit, which in its
turn resulted in PLN suffering financially, especially as a result of the devaluation of
the rupiah.86 Many of the IPPs that were yet to produce at the time were abandoned
while others were only able to continue with their PPAs renegotiated down to a much
lower off-take price.87 Overall, a significant degree of investor confidence in the sector
was lost.
Given such deteriorating conditions, PLN was left in a position where it
could not fund investment independently to satisfy the country’s consistently rising
demand for electricity. In 2002, the Government introduced electricity reforms largely
through the enactment of the 2002 Electricity law under which power business areas
were divided into competitive and non-competitive areas; the former allowing for
private participation in the generation and retailing areas of the electricity value
chain.88 The law also allowed for electricity tariffs to be determined by the market
and for independent regulation through the establishment of the Electricity Market
Supervisory Agency.89 However, in 2004 the Constitutional Court ruled the 2002
Electricity Law to be unconstitutional largely in light of electricity’s status as a social
necessity and the constitutional requirement for its delivery to remain exclusively
with a State owned agency.90 As a result, the Court effectively re-installed the previous
1985 Law and as a further consequence, from the period of 1999-2004 there was very
little private investment of any sort in new power projects. This phenomenon will be
the center of attention for further discussion in this article.
1. Article 33 of the Constitution as a Guarantee to Secure the National
Electricity Sector

The famous Article 33 the Constitution of 1945 states that “branches of production,
important to the state and that impact the livelihood of the majority of the people
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must be controlled by the state and … that the riches contained in the earth and the
waters constituting the territory of the Republic of Indonesia must be used for the
maximum benefit of the people.”91 The founding fathers of the nation believed that
only if the state or a state enterprise representing the state controls would the result
be in the best interest of the people.92 This was the prevailing belief at the time and,
to some extent, is still today.93 Additionally, the Elucidation on Article 33 also states,
however, that only companies that do not affect the livelihood of the majority of the
population may be operated privately.94

It further raises the question as to what form should state intervention take? The
People’s Consultative Assembly (‘MPR’) highlighted two main activities:95 (i) the
State should ensure that all Indonesians have the opportunity to participate in the
economy and to share in its spoils, including those arising out of the exploitation of
natural resources, with priority for cooperatives and small-medium enterprises over
individual endeavors; (ii) The state should protect the weak from domination by the
economically strong, whether domestic or foreign. This interpretation by the Member,
presumably, thought that the free market could not appropriately guarantee people’s
welfare and thus leading to the misinterpretation of the principles, rather than the
principles themselves, that had caused most of the economic problems in Indonesia.96
2. The Enactment of National Energy Policy (KEN), General National Energy
Plan (RUEN) and General National Electricity Plan (RUKN)
In exercising the mandate of Article 33 Paragraph 3 of the 1945 Constitution,
Law No. 30 Year 2007 on Energy instructs the government, through the National
Energy Council (‘DEN’), to design National Energy Policy (‘KEN’) until the year
2050 by taking into account several considerations such as: (i) energy availability to
fulfill national needs; (ii) priority of energy development; (iii) utilization of national
energy resources; and (iv) supporting national energy reserves.97 The intention of
drafting such policy was based on the assumption that during such long term period
all the hindrances would be overcome along the way, transforming the government’s
traditional mindset of ‘business as usual’ into a more sustainable one (i.e. what and
which current energy potential should be optimized, and what needs to be achieved
in the long run).98 The said policy was subsequently used as guideline for DEN to
enact: (i) the General National Energy Plan (‘RUEN’) as a technical follow up on KEN
91
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in achieving KEN’s long term goals; 99 and (ii) the General National Electricity Plan
(‘RUKN’) covering areas of generation, transmission and distribution of electricity.100
The government has recently established the President Regulation No. 1 Year 2014 on
Arrangement of the National Energy Policy Guidelines with the outlook to maintain
the government’s consistency between the systematics and substance in drafting the
RUEN.
Thus far, the government has predicted that by the year 2025 energy demand in
Indonesia would reach 228 MTOE (Million Tons Oil Equivalent) and the government
will be encouraged to provide 337 MTOE of energy supply.101 A great number of plans
have been drafted and established, yet the technical implementation of such plans is
still absent in practice. We will now review the previous government efforts to meet
energy demands, especially in the electricity sector.
B. Indonesian Electricity Sector: De Facto

1. Current Capacities and Facilities
According to Perusahaan Listrik Negara (‘PLN’)’s executive summary of the
electricity supply business plan for 2015-2024, Indonesia’s electricity conditions as
of September 2014 can be described as follows:102
a. Installed capacity of power plants for both PLN and Independent Power
Producers (‘IPP’s) in Indonesia was 43,457 MW which consisted of 33,499 MW
in Java-Bali, 6,166 MW in Sumatra and 3,842 MW in East Indonesia;
b. The total number of renting power plants was 3,640 MW;
c. The generating capacity in Sumatra and East Indonesia was barely sufficient
to meet the electricity needs of the community, thus, potential shortfall could
occur whenever there was a disruption to the power supply or a plant needed
to undergo routine maintenance.
The estimated amount of investment needed by Indonesia for developing power
generation, transmission and distribution lines and facilities in order to meet the
expected demand in the future is approximately USD107.^93 billion, out of which
USD77.^98 billion for developing additional capacity of power plants, USD15.^98
billion for transmission and USD13.^97 billion for electricity distribution.103 These
numbers clearly indicate that PLN and the Government of Indonesia have to carry
a heavy burden to satisfy domestic electricity demand. Expansion in the Indonesian
power subsector over the past decade has not kept up with increased power demand
that averaged about 8% over the last five years.104 Generation capacity additions are
delayed, and underinvestment and infrastructural deficits extend to the transmission
99
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and distribution systems.105 Indices for power system stability and reliability are
showing deteriorating trends, and there have been recent incidences of blackouts in
Sumatra and Java.106
2. Indonesia’s Efforts to Boost Supply: PPP and Fast Track Program
(Phase I, and II)

The government recognizes that business-as-usual will not lead to increased
access to reliable and cost-effective supplies of electricity.107 As a consequence, it
imposed the Public-Private Partnership (‘PPP’) scheme in 2005 and enacted the two
stages of Fast Track Program (‘FTP’) since 2006 in order to incentivize and attract
investors to spend their money in Indonesia’s power projects.108 Brief description of
the concept of PPP and FTP will be provided in this article.

a. The PPP Concept in Indonesian Power Projects
The concept of IPP originated in the US law in the late 1990s and early 2000s which
was described to denote government contracts in which the private sector takes on
more responsibility than has been customary in the past for the delivery of the services
contracted for.109 Some see it as a new governance tool that will replace the traditional
method of contracting for public services through competitive tendering.110 Others
see PPP as a new expression in the language of public management, one intended to
include older, established procedures of involvement of private organizations in the
delivery of public services.111 In either of the definitions used, PPP is a concept which
promises a new way of managing and governing organizations that produce public
services.112
Generally, the difference between business-as-usual and PPP in power projects
is that, in PPP, the government gives its guarantee to such projects through PT
Penjaminan Infrastruktur Indonesia (Persero) (Indonesia Infrastructure Guarantee
Fund).113 This concept is laid down in Presidential Regulation No. 38 of 2015
on Cooperation between Government and Business Entities in the Provision of
Infrastructure and Bappenas Regulation No. 4 of 2015 on Guidelines for Cooperation
Between Government and Business Entities in the Provision of Infrastructure.

In sum, PPP in power projects consists of 5 big categories of shareholders, which
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are as follows114: (i) Providers of Capital & Guarantees; (ii) Government Policy Makers,
Regulators, and Counterparties; (iii) Service Off-takers; (iv) Third Party Service
Providers; and most importantly, (v) Project Companies. PLN, the state-owned power
utility, no longer holds monopoly for the provision of electricity infrastructure (power
generation, transmission and distribution). However, PLN may continue to function
as off-taker for power generation. Business entities may participate in this sector
through competitive tendering.115

The first PPP was the Central Java Coal-Fired Power Plant (CJPP) with a proposed
capacity of 2 x 1000 MW and an estimated investment of USD4 billion in 2011.116 This
project also provided the first utilization of the IIGF guarantee (issued in October
2011); however, the consortium of the J-Power, Adaro Energy and Itochu groups in
2014 declared force majeure stating that circumstances and events delaying the land
acquisition process were not within their control.117 A research shows that there are
several gridlocks to Indonesia’s PPP, namely as follows:118 (i) the lack of transparency
of the manner in which projects are selected and prioritized as PPPs; (ii) PPPs are
still viewed primarily as a means of financing, and often perceived as too complex due
to the extensive coordination required for implementation; (iii) many government
contracting agencies lack the right set of skills; and (iv) land acquisition.
b. The Two Phases of FTP
The FTP project was enacted by President Yudhoyono. In 2006, the Government
announced stage one of a “fast track” program (‘FTP I’) to build the first 10,000 MW
which was focused entirely on the construction of coal-fired power plants, mostly by
PLN.119 Followed by a second program (‘FTP II’) in early 2010 whereby each program
was aimed to accelerate the development of 10,000 MW of generating capacity with
FTP II (launched in early 2010 under Presidential Regulation No. 4/2010 amended
most recently by PR No. 194/2014 and revised by MoEMR Regulation No. 40/2014)
geared towards IPPs and renewable energy as cleaner energy sources.120 However, the
new five-years 35 GW program announced by President Joko Widodo has superseded
the FTP II and all projects planned for completion between 2015 and 2019 have been
rolled over into the 35 GW program121
At the end of Phase I, PLN had realized 63% of the total planned capacity by end
of 2013 and targeted to complete it by 2015, a delay from the originally scheduled
completion by the year of 2010.122 In the case of FTP II, with target capacity of 17,900
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MW it was scheduled to be completed by the year 2016.123 However, it is yet to be
in operation and various projects are estimated to only begin operation in 2016 at
the earliest due to the following causes:124 (i) licensing issues; (ii) land clearing; (iii)
financing, delay in government-backed loan; (iv) construction and various technical
difficulties. In view of the foregoing, it is an undeniable fact that the second FTP is still
is not adequate to meet Indonesia’s increasing demand for energy.
V.

REGULATED MARKET VERSUS COMPETITION: LESSON LEARNED FROM THE
EU

A. Constitutional Court Decisions on Electricity Law: Decision No. 001-021022/PUU-I/2003 and Decision No. 149/PUU-VII/2009
1. Decision No. 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003
In its decision, the Constitutional Court submitted that restructuring and
unbundling in the electricity sector are deemed to be unprofitable and inefficient and
resulted in a burden the government has to bear.125 It further held that Articles 16,
17(3) and 68 of the Law, which sought to introduce competition and unbundling in
the electricity sector, conflicted with Article 33(2) of the Constitution because they
would, in fact, result in the relinquishing of control in the sense intended by the said
Article and as of the consequences declared to be invalid.126 The most important aspect
of the Constitutional Court’s decision was that merely regulating the electricity sector
was insufficient to constitute ‘control by state’ as required by Article 33(2).127
The interpretation of the term ‘control by state’ is thus indeed at the heart of this
decision. Each of the Parties have a different perspective about the manner in which
the State exercises control over electricity. The State Enterprises Minister interpreted
‘controlled by the State’ to mean ‘regulated, facilitated and operated by the State’, but
dynamically moving towards the state only regulating and facilitating.128 Referring to
the testimony of Prof. Dr. Harun Alrasid who interpreted ‘controlled by the state’ to
mean ‘owned’ by the state.

The Court itself subsequently took the view that Article 33 required more than
ownership over important branches of production in the civil law sense because
‘state control’ exists within the Constitution framework of ‘public law, political
democracy and economic democracy’ (which it did not define).129 The Court argued
that the civil concept of ‘ownership’ was therefore insufficient because it did not, in
itself, necessarily provide the welfare of the people or social justice, as is required in
the Preamble to the Constitution.130
However, the Court engaged in ‘historical’ approach to interpret the term ‘control’
under Article 33(2) of the Constitution. Referring to Mohammad Hatta as one of
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the founding fathers, ‘The vested goal under Article 33 of the Constitution is that
the production (of natural resources) is to be governed by the government with
foreign capital incentives which is regulated by our Government.’131 To do so was, of
course, an act that reflected the Explanatory Memorandum of the Constitution as it
stood before it was deleted during the amendment process and it severely strained
the limits of the Court’s authority, given that the whole purpose of deleting the
Explanatory Memorandum was precisely to prevent it from being used to interpret
the Constitution.132 The said approach was too narrow to be used in determining such
complexity of the industry.
In the author’s perspective, the most essential element in interpreting the Law is
being focused on how to bring the greatest benefit to the people, rather than focusing
on the element of ‘controlled by the State.’ Indeed, Article 33 needs to be interpreted
using a more contextual approach by constructing an interpretation that is fully
reasoned, matches the factual circumstances of the current situation and explains
the wording to the fullest extent possible. It simply means not only look at it solely
from the perspective of the past, but also considering present and future situations to
obtain the greatest benefit out of production for the people.
2. Decision No. 149/PUU-I/2009

In 2009, the current Electricity Law was challenged yet again by the PLN labor
union due to the enactment of Law 30 Year 2009 on Electricity which opens up
private participation in power supply and distribution, ending PLN’s monopoly.133
The idea was to, again, challenge the unbundling concept contained therein. The
petitioner argued that Article 10 of the Law contains the provision ‘may be integrated’
which implies that it may or may not be integrated or it may be unbundled and this
violates the Constitution.134 To take a look at the petitioner’s argument, it was similar
to the argument raised by the petitioner in the former Decision No. 001-021-022/
PUU-I/2003, which also challenged the unbundling concept requesting for it to be
deemed unconstitutional. However, in the latest Decision No. 149/PUU-I/2009, the
Court rejected the petitioner’s submission in its entirety.135
Indeed, the Court referred to and highlighted the former Decision; however,
it came up with a completely different treatment of the unbundling concept. In its
decision, it allowed the unbundling concept under Law No. 30 Year 2009 based on the
Court’s interpretation of the former Decision, which can be summed up as follows:136
(i) the Government as the majority shareholder (of PLN), still exercises its control
on the decision making level; (ii) Article 33 of the Constitution does not prohibit
privatization, as long as such privatization does not eliminate the control of the State;
(iii) similarly, Article 33 of the Constitution does not prohibit competition among
the providers either as long as such competition does not eliminate the control of
131
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the state including the control to govern (regelendaad), to manage (bestuursdaad),
and to supervise (toezichtoudensdaad) existing important branches of production
for the greatest benefit of the People; and (iv) emphasizing the unbundling concept
implemented by various companies under Article 16 of Law No. 20 Year 2002 will
only lead to the deterioration of PLN and the non-sustainability of electricity supply
to the people.137

There is a noteworthy point raised in this Decision. Fundamentally, there has been
an inconsistency between the former and the latter Decisions in the context of the
unbundling concept in the electricity sector. In the former Decision it was strictly
stipulated that electricity was considered as a public utility which falls under the
category of existing important branches of production and it should therefore be
controlled (‘owned’) by the State. In contrast to such submission, the latter Decision
interpreted the Article 33 of the Constitution to be more flexible, stating that Article
33 does not prohibit unbundling and competition in the electricity sector because the
unbundling concept in Law No. 30 Year 2009 is not the same concept as the one in
Law No. 20 Year 2002. This, however still constitutes the separation of the electricity
industry and generally falls under the same concept of unbundling. Even if the Court’s
basis for this argument was that under the Law No. 30 Year 2009 stipulates that the
provision of pricing mechanism is regulated by the State. It clearly stipulates that it
is sufficient to exercise control over electricity without having to own the commodity
itself.
B. Unbundling and Competition in the Electricity Sector Are Proven to
Provide Cheaper and Better Electricity Supply in Terms of Quality

Unbundling alone, however, is not a panacea and it should be seen in the context of
measures in the area of security of supply, investment incentives, and regulation of the
energy sectors by the national competent bodies and it also needs to be complemented
and reinforced by the application of competition laws.138 The government is under the
obligation to support the national regulatory regime in order to enable competition
in the market. The monopolistic nature of this industry is bound to pose a burden
on VIUs to operate and develop the infrastructure. An example from Indonesia’s
current system is that PLN still remains heavily subsidized and functions as the grid
operator which possesses and controls the national monopoly on the transmission
and distribution system.139 As a consequence, it poses a burden on the government
to subsidize such operation and customers as PLN failed to perform its obligation
as a TSO to develop the infrastructure in order to secure the energy supply in the
long run. In the new environment, PLN is challenged to manage its risks and margins.
The disparity between highly volatile electric commodity prices and the more stable
nature of domestic power prices is overshadowed by the need to consider a multitude
of socio-economic and geopolitical vulnerabilities.140
There are several available strategic options for PLN as the electricity market
continues to evolve and transform, including distribution system optimization,
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accelerating technology enhancement (i.e. smart grid infrastructure), demand
management programs (i.e. smart meters) and access to new capital.141 Such options will
less likely to be achieved if there is no support from the Government to ensure that the
national regulatory regime in the country is sustained and in favor of PLN to unbundle
the industry. The restructuring of the Indonesian electricity market is imperative. The
resulting tangible benefits include, but are not limited to, reduced generation costs,
more competitive electricity prices and enhanced national competitiveness as a result
of improved standard of living and social safety net programs (i.e., job creation, food
security, education, health and community empowerment) that Indonesian people
will embrace.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This article has described the latest conditions (both de facto and de jure), examples
of countries successfully implementing the liberalization of the electricity industry
and an analysis of the Indonesian Constitutional Court’s Decision on the annulment of
Law No. 2002 on Electricity. The unique characteristics of this industry compelled the
Government and its related stakeholders to reconsider deregulation and complete
restructuring of this essential industry in order to meet the country’s demand for
economic growth. To achieve such goal, it is noteworthy that the same perception
and awareness of this urgency are acquired and acknowledged by all layers of related
stakeholders, be it the Government of Indonesia, the Constitutional Court, PLN as well
as the Indonesian people in general.
Research conducted on power projects in an emerging economy such as Indonesia
generally relies on a significant proportion of finance from international markets to
be viable.142 The results of this analysis suggest the following:143 (i) electricity access is
a matter of policy, not a consequence of wealth and settlement patterns; and (ii) while
the challenge of electrification is most acute in eastern Indonesia, efforts to achieve
universal access must be made nationwide. There are several strategies available to
meet such challenges, such as:144 (i) finding ways to minimize the costs of serving both
and existing electricity connections and (ii) develop standard legal and procedural
structures to reduce the costs of putting new solutions together.
The Government of Indonesia has set an ambitious goal through its National Energy
Plan, General National Energy Plan, General National Electricity Plan and Electricity
Supply Business Plan 2015-2024. However, without complete restructuring and
deregulation in the said sectors enabling investment, such goal is deemed to be only
an ideal plan on paper. Prompted by an intrinsic motivation behind the restructuring
of the Indonesian electricity market and when market deregulation is prudently
structured, the combination of competitive services, asset divestiture, and new
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investments should minimize the net cost of generation and result in competitive
retail prices for electricity.145 These conditions are expected to lead to better quality of
electricity services and various choices of service providers will most likely improve
the standard of living of Indonesians.146 The time has never been more critical to
advance an open electricity market in Indonesia in which retail competition and
consumer choices are the new norms, not the exceptions.
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